fnctId=thesis,fnctNo=358
[신혜림] Optimal social distancing policy incorporating compliance of individuals
- 작성자
- scsc연구센터
- 저자
- Hyelim Shin, Taesik Lee
- 발행사항
- 발행일
- 20260807
- 저널명
- Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- 국문초록
- 영문초록
- We develop a novel optimization model for designing optimal social distancing policies by explicitly incorporating individuals’ compliance behavior, a factor often neglected in existing studies. Building on prior work that characterizes equilibrium compliance in a social distancing game, we integrate such equilibrium behavior into a policy optimization framework. The proposed framework captures individuals’ decisions on social activity levels as strategic responses to social distancing policies within a game-theoretic setting. However, directly embedding equilibrium compliance as a constraint renders the resulting optimization problem highly intractable due to its implicit and nonlinear structure. To address the computational challenges, we exploit structural properties of the equilibrium conditions and reformulate the problem as a tractable optimal control model. This enables the computation of optimal policy trajectories while endogenously accounting for individuals’ behavioral responses. Through numerical experiments, we examine how optimal policies vary with disease characteristics and behavioral factors. Our results reveal that the effectiveness of social distancing policies depends critically on perceived infection risk, sensitivity to individual utility to social activity, and the transmission rate of the epidemic. Notably, we find that it may be optimal to maintain or even strengthen social distancing measures even as the epidemic subsides. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating behavioral responses into policy design and provide actionable insights for effective epidemic control.
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